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Essay Abstract

Were “It” to Happen: Contract Continuity Under Euro Regime Change
Robert Hockett

One way or another, the European Monetary Union (EMU) is apt to endure. The
prospect of continuation under the precise contours of the regime as we presently find it,
however, is anything but certain. Hence many investors and other actual or prospective contract
parties are likely to remain skittish until matters grow clearer.
This skittishness, importantly, can itself hamper the prospect of expeditious European
recovery. Addressing particular sources of ongoing uncertainty about EMU prospects can itself
therefore aid in the project of recovery. This Essay accordingly aims to impose structure upon
one particular, and indeed particularly complex, source of uncertainty now damaging EMU
prospects. That is the matter of how best to defend, legally speaking, continuity of contract in
the event of some basic change in the current Euro regime.
The hope is that sizing up and breaking down this question into its constituent parts
might accomplish at least three related aims. One is to render the hypothetical problems raised
by the question more tractable than they would otherwise be. Another is to facilitate the
development of provisional plans of approach to such problems in the event they should present
themselves. Finally, yet another is to afford confidence to the markets by enabling contingency
planning of the sort just suggested, thereby lessening the likelihood of self-fulfilling ‘run’-like
activity on European debt instruments.
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I. INTRODUCTION: ADDRESSING THE HYPOTHETICAL TO KEEP IT HYPOTHETICAL
One way or another, the European Monetary Union (EMU) is apt to endure.1 The
sunk costs, future stakes, and prospective price of failure are simply too high to permit
disunion to become truly thinkable to most current members. The prospect of
continuation under the precise contours of the regime as we presently find it, however,

*

Professor of Law, Cornell Law School; Resident Consultant, Federal Reserve Bank of New York;
Fellow, The Century Foundation. Thanks to Dan Alpert, Lee Buchheit, Joyce Hansen, Jay Pelosky,
Ayodeji Perrin, Joe Sommer, Peter Tchir and Janine Tramontana for their thoughts. Faults are my own.
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Much has been written over the past several years about the possibility, desirability, and
undesirability of partial or full EMU dissolution. In the interest of brevity I shall cite only my own two most
recent interventions in the discussion. See Robert Hockett, A Tale of Two Currencies (2012) (working
paper, on file with the author); and Robert Hockett, Five Angry Elephants, Benzinga Financial News
Website, March 14, 2012, available at http://www.benzinga.com/general/topics/12/03/2424391/five-angryelephants#.
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is anything but certain.2 Hence many investors and other actual or prospective contract
parties are likely to remain skittish until matters grow clearer.
This skittishness, importantly, can itself hamper the prospect of full and
expeditious European recovery. Addressing particular sources of ongoing uncertainty
about EMU prospects can itself therefore aid in the project of recovery. In that light I
hope here to impose a bit of structure upon one particular, and indeed particularly
complex, source of uncertainty now damaging EMU prospects. That is the matter of
how best to defend, legally speaking, continuity of contract in the event of some basic
change in the current Euro regime.
My hope is that sizing up and breaking down this question into its constituent
parts might accomplish at least three related aims. One is to render the hypothetical
problems raised by the question at least somewhat more tractable than they appear
presently to be. Another is to facilitate the development of provisional plans of
approach to such problems in the event they should ultimately indeed present
themselves. Finally, yet another is to afford confidence to the markets by enabling
contingency planning of the sort just suggested, thereby lessening the likelihood of selffulfilling ‘run’-like activity on European debt instruments.
The project is indeed complex. It also turns out, however, to be more or less
tractable. The principal challenge is in deciding how best to order the presentation with
a view to rendering the analysis as immediately graspable by intuition as possible.
What has come to seem best to me in this connection is to structure the presentation
principally by reference to three fundamental ‘dimensions,’ or ‘layers,’ of complexity.
Additional sources of complexity, seemingly less ‘fundamental’ even if numerous and
important, can then be folded-in in a more or less ad hoc manner at minimal frustration
to intuition.
That, then, is the plan I adopt for what follows. Part II lays out the advertised
‘fundamental layers.’ Part III then notes several additional layers of complexity that are
less fundamental and accordingly best dealt with in ad hoc fashion. Part IV then
analyzes the contract continuity question across layers by reference to several nonfanciful hypothetical situations in which contract continuity would be implicated.
Part V briefly addresses an additional complexity that some might believe to be
introduced by 1997 Amendments made to the New York General Obligations Law, to
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My own guess would be that a temporary two-tiered Euro arrangement will prove most workable
and attractive in the near future. See Hockett, Two Currencies, id.
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which many Euro-denominated financial contracts are subject. Part VI then concludes
and looks forward. An Appendix reduces the analyses of Parts IV and V to readily
intuited ‘flowchart’ form.

II. LAYERS OF FUNDAMENTAL COMPLEXITY
To begin with the first two layers of fundamental complexity, which probably
deserve most attention because they are least immediately familiar: There appear, first,
to be two distinct regime-change (hereinafter ‘Regime Change’) scenarios to consider –
viz., partial and full dissolution of the EMU. There appear, second, to be two contractual
performance-impediment (hereinafter ‘Performance Impediment’) scenarios to consider
– viz., those that give rise to colorable ‘impracticability’ excuses of performance on the
one hand, and those that give rise to colorable ‘impossibility’ excuses of performance on
the other hand.
These various Regime Change and Performance Impediment scenarios are
cross-cutting, precisely because they are situated on distinct ‘dimensions.’ Each
alternative upon one dimension, in other words, can be paired with either alternative on
the other dimension. Hence there are four possible combinations of combined Regime
Change and Performance Impediment Scenarios. I’ll assign italicized Roman numerals
I and II to the Change scenarios, and italicized alphabet letters A and B to the
Impediment scenarios. Our possible combinations then will be IA, IB, IIA, and IIB.
Turning next to the third layer of fundamental complexity, which comprises
various ‘Venue’ scenarios, as I’ll call them: This one enters the picture in virtue of the
existence of multiple jurisdictions in which a contract action might be brought in
response to some breech stemming from Scenarios IA, IB, IIA, or IIB.
Happily, as it turns out, this multiplicity can itself be more or less safely reduced,
like those in connection with Regime Change and Performance Impediment, to a factor
of two. For the principal distinction that matters turns out to be that between courts of a
nation that has left the EMU on the one hand, and all other courts on the other hand.3
I’ll accordingly employ italicized Hindu-Arabic numerals for tracking purposes in this
case and distinguish between what I’ll call Scenarios ‘1’ and ‘2’ along this ‘Venue’
3

This turns out to be so, in turn, because the courts of a nation that has left the EMU will ignore the
distinction between Impediment scenarios A and B, while other courts for their part will either follow courts
of the former sort, or resort to more or less identical doctrines – some version of ‘impracticability’ or
‘impossibility’ doctrine – in connection with each such Impediment scenario.
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dimension of complexity – ‘1’ for suits brought in courts of a particular nation that has
exited the EMU, and ‘2’ for suits brought elsewhere.
Summing up, all of the foregoing entails that we now have eight possible
combinations of Regime Change, Performance Impediment, and Venue scenarios to
consider: IA1, IA2, IB1, IB2, IIA1, IIA2, IIB1, and IIB2.
III. ADDITIONAL LAYERS OF COMPLEXITY
As mentioned in the Introduction, there are, alas, several more complexities that
arise in connection with all of this. One, for example, is occasioned by variation in
respect of the new currency regime – fixed?, adjustably pegged?, floating? – that a
nation exiting the EMU might adopt.4 And these of course bear upon all sorts of
eventualities that might affect contract performance and thus implicate our Contract
Continuity problem.
But since (a) three dimensions – and thus eight combinations! – already are
plenty to track, while (b) the same dimensions suffice more or less to accommodate the
basic structure of our analysis, and (c)the additional complexities seem a bit less
‘fundamental’ in any event, I’ll simply fold those in where they turn out to be salient.
Before now turning to the analysis, it might be helpful first quickly to summarize
the proverbial ‘bottom line.’ Unfortunately that is not easy to do in prose without quickly
becoming incomprehensible, at least prior to running through the analysis itself. What I
shall do instead, then, is simply to direct your attention to a flowchart I append to the
end, which in a compact manner summarizes all that is about to follow.
And now off to the races.

IV. ANALYSIS ACROSS LAYERS
Please recall first that there are two Regime Change scenarios to consider:
I. ‘Regime Change I’ (Exit by One or More EMU Members): One or more countries
exits EMU.
Others remain. (EMU, in other words, persists, but has lost at least one of its
erstwhile members.)
II.

4

‘Regime Change II’ (Dissolution): EMU dissolves altogether.

Quick explanation of these regimes.
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Now begin with Regime Change Scenario I (Exit by One or More EMU Members):
How might contractual continuity come to be implicated? Here is what would seem a
prototypical hypothetical – “the Hypothetical.” I’ll lay it out by reference first to a
particular change (“the Change”) that amounts to an instance of the Regime Change I
scenario, then a typical plaintiff (“the Plaintiff”) and defendant (“the Defendant”) whose
contractual relation might be affected by the change.
A. First Hypothetical
1. The Change
Assume first that, oh, I don’t know, … Greece exits the EMU. It replaces the
Euro with, say, a new or revived national currency, the NeoDrachma (NeoD). It
stipulates some initial NeoD/Euro exchange rate and formally redenominates all preexisting contracts bearing some nexus to Greece – e.g. Greek sovereign bonds, loans
to Greek nationals, etc. – in NeoD. Call this ‘the Change.’ Something like this Change
would seem to be requisite to contractual continuity’s being so much as implicated
under Regime Change Scenario I.
Next, note that Greece might adopt any of several polices with respect to the
post-Change NeoD/Euro exchange rate. (So here’s another layer of complexity, but I’m
not numbering or lettering, just folding it in so as to avoid an unwieldy number of
‘fundamental dimensions.’):
First, Greece might undertake to maintain the initially stipulated exchange rate
indefinitely, effectively pegging the NeoD to the Euro. This seems unlikely unless
Greece intends that the peg be adjustable, more on which prospect below. For
adopting a nonadjustable peg would allow Greece at most one devaluation relative to
the Euro – namely, the one conducted via the initially stipulated exchange rate. And
presumably a wish for sufficient monetary policy autonomy as to permit repeated
periodic de- and/or revaluations would be among those considerations prompting the
Change in the first place.
A second prospect seems nearly as unlikely: That would be Greece’s aiming to
permit a free float of its currency on the ForEx markets. This seems unlikely in light of
the new NeoD’s likely vulnerability, at least early on, to speculative attack on global
markets.
More likely, then, Greece will aim to operate with, third, an adjustable peg, or
fourth, a ‘managed float’ on the ForEx markets. Either policy will presumably be
conducted by its central bank – the Bank of Greece, or ‘BG’ (which is not to be confused
with the Australian singing group of the I970s).
5

Now, if Greece maintains a nonadjustable peg – again, unlikely – it will surely
have to employ strict capital controls as well. Some slightly more relaxed form of capital
control or regulation, variably strict depending on events in the global capital and ForEx
markets, also will presumably be necessary in connection with an adjustable peg or a
managed float. Since adjustable peg or managed float seem more likely, per the
considerations adduced just above, it seems reasonable to conclude that there will be at
least some degree of capital control exercised by Greece under the new regime.
In any event, which of these strategies is selected, and how successfully it is
implemented if it be something other than free float, will certainly bear upon subsequent
possible litigation, in manners to be noted below.
2. The Plaintiff and Defendant
Next, per our hypothetical, we’ll assume that a, oh, I don’t know … German
national is owed a contractual debt by the Greek Treasury or a Greek national. The
contract denominates the debt in Euro, and the German national prefers to be paid in
Euro per the terms of the original contract.
In such case, if the Greek Treasury or our Greek national has traded-in Euros for
NeoD at the initially stipulated exchange rate, and that rate has not since changed, and
the Bank of Greece retains Euro reserves and is willing to exchange Euro for Drachma
with the Greek Treasury or Greek national for purposes of facilitating transactions
between the latter and Germans, then we need have no contractual continuity problem.
The Greek Treasury or Greek national might simply purchase Euro from the BG with
NeoD and pay the German national in Euro. On the other hand …
If and only if one of the following occur, however, the Greek Treasury or our Greek
national might well encounter difficulty in performing on the contract with Euros rather
than NeoD, even if they wish to do so. The legal significance that the difficulty carries
will ride upon which actually occurs. As for the latter, as noted above there seem to be
two basic possibilities – two ‘Impediment Scenarios’ – to consider:
a. Impediment Scenario A (Colorable Impracticability)
We assume that Greece has allowed the NeoD to float, either freely or in
managed fashion, or it maintains an adjustable peg which has indeed now been
adjusted. Assume either way that the consequence is that the NeoD now is worth much
less relative to Euro than it was at the time of the Change.

6

We’ll assume that the Greek Treasury or Greek national may still purchase Euro
from Bank of Greece or on ForEx market – no capital controls sufficiently onerous as to
prevent or prohibit this – but at very high NeoD cost. This will invite – though not
guarantee, as we’ll see – invocation of the ‘commercial impracticability’ excuse of
contractual performance by our Greek defendant should the German national sue for
payment in Euro, per terms of the contract, in court – particularly in non-Greek court.5

b. Impediment Scenario B (Colorable Impossibility)
We shall assume that Greece maintains strict or adjustable peg, or manages
float, and to facilitate pursuit of that policy also imposes capital controls. Controls are
such, in turn, as to prevent ready purchase of Euro with NeoD.
If such purchase is simply rendered more difficult than it otherwise would have
been, but is not rendered illegal or otherwise literally impossible, then again we are
looking at a prospective ‘impracticability’ excuse of performance, as in Impediment
Scenario A just above. If, on the other hand, capital controls are such as actually to
render purchase of Euro with NeoD illegal or literally impossible, then this will invite –
though not guarantee, as we’ll see – invocation of ‘impossibility’ excuse of contractual
performance should German national demand payment in Euro, per terms of the
contract, in court – particularly non-Greek court.6
All right. Finally, proceeding to our final dimension of variation within the context of
this Hypothetical, assume that our German plaintiff sues our Greek defendant on the
contract, seeking payment in Euros, not NeoD. There are then two more scenarios –
‘Venue Scenarios’ – to consider:
c. Venue Scenario 1 (Action Brought in Greek Court)
Let us assume that the contract action is brought in Greek court. In this case the
redenomination is likely to be fully recognized, inasmuch as Greek courts apply Greek
law. Obligations accordingly held dischargeable in NeoD, presumably in amounts
determined by the legislated exchange rate. Court holds that Greek defendant may pay
German plaintiff in NeoD. (Note that the difference between Impediment Scenarios A

5

As we’ll see below, in Greek court the defendant is not likely to be found even to be in breech if
s/he pays in NeoD, though this isn’t quite certain.
6

Same story here as in supra, note 2.
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and B is accordingly irrelevant here. Combinations IA1 and IB1 effectively collapse into
one.)
Presumably, however, plaintiff now will hope to appeal to some higher court
within Greek, EU, or global legal systems, perhaps challenging the legislation itself on
constitutional or cognate treaty grounds insofar as it impairs preexisting contractual
obligations. (More on this prospect later.)

d. Venue Scenario 2 (Action Brought in Non-Greek Court)
Now we assume that the contract action is brought in a non-Greek – e.g., a New
York – court. In this case the court will embark upon a multi-step analysis:
i. Lex Monetae
First, analysis will commence with an attempt to determine the lex monetae – the
law of the sovereign that issues the currency named in the contract. The reason for this
is that that law, per the ‘state theory’ of money that all nations (including the US) appear
to uphold, will determine what counts as tender in discharge of an obligation
denominated in the currency issued by that sovereign. And this is so notwithstanding
any depreciation on the part of some newly issued currency relative to which ever
currency it replaces. It is likewise so notwithstanding any other body of law named in
the contract (i.e., any ‘law of the contract,’ per ii, below). In other words, the lex
monetae, effectively implicated straightaway by the contract’s naming a currency at all,
supervenes upon any additional lex named in the contract.
A potentially vexing question can arise here, however, depending on whether
Greece and the EU/EMU agree or disagree on the terms of Greece’s exit from the EMU.
Hence we have yet another layer of complexity here, but again I am simply folding-this
one in to avoid an unwieldy number of ‘fundamental dimensions’ pursuant to which I
structure our analysis.
So, first, were Greece to leave the EMU pursuant to some formal agreement
upon all terms of which Greece and the EU/EMU were in accord, the answer to the lex
monetae question would be straightforward. The Greek legislation would be given full
effect in the foreign (non-Greek) court just as in the domestic (Greek) court. In such
case we would accordingly be faced with a situation indistinguishable from that of 1,
above. The contract obligation would be dischargeable in NeoD, unless Greek and
EU/EMU law themselves were challengeable on constitutional or international legal
grounds sounding in human rights and contract-impairment.
8

If, by contrast, Greece were to exit the EMU on terms not agreed by the two
authorities (Greece on the one hand, EU/EMU on the other), then our lex monetae
question would seemingly be unanswerable. For there would appear then to be no
determinate reply to the ‘which money?’ question. That is because the EU/EMU (then
including Greece) was and remains the issuer of that currency which is named in the
contract, while Greece is the issuer of that currency into which the contract now has
been putatively redenominated by Greek legislative fiat.
In other words, because ‘which currency?’ is precisely the question here, and
because two authorities each of which has a colorable claim to sovereignty over the
question at issue would be in disagreement, we would not be able to determine what
counts as tender by reference to ‘the’ law of ‘the’ country that issues ‘the’ currency.7
Hence we would move on to…

ii. Law of the Contract
Next, if there is disagreement between Greece and the EMU over the terms of
Greece’s exit, hence no determinate lex monetae, we fall back to the so-called ‘law of
the contract,’ if such there be. That is, if the contract states which law shall govern its
own interpretation and application, proceed to analyze the case under that law. (Many
financial contracts of course stipulate that the law of the State of New York shall
govern.)
If the law in question is that of Greece, then we are again back to Venue
Scenario 1, above. The foreign court will decide as the Greek court would have done.
If the law is not that of Greece, then we proceed to iv, below, to apply the apposite
jurisdiction’s impracticability or impossibility doctrines, depending on whether we’re

7

It is perhaps worth noting here that this problem seems to be simply a straightforward entailment
of that ambiguity which afflicts the concept of ‘sovereignty’ itself in the context of a ‘union’ or ‘federation’
of still putatively ‘sovereign’ states. EU and EMU members retain some degree of sovereignty, of course,
yet also cede certain classic incidents of sovereignty, in a manner not unlike that in which US states were
understood to have done in the early years of the American republic prior to the Civil War.
Conundrums stemming from disagreement between states and their union over which party bears
sovereignty over some particular subject, such as currency, do not always lend themselves to
th
straightforward answers in such cases. (That is one of the reasons that 18 century British lawyers
argued that colonial American claims on behalf of ‘divided sovereignty’ (the ‘King in Parliament’ being the
sovereign of England, the ‘King in the House of Burgesses [in the person of the Royal Governor]’ being
the sovereign of Virginia, etc.) constituted logical absurdities. ‘No imperium in imperio,’ the ‘unitary
sovereign’ advocates cried. Maybe they were right?)
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faced with Impediment Scenario A or B. Finally, if the contract does not name any
particular body of law as governing – that is, if there is no ‘law of the contract’ – then we
fall back to …

iii. Conflicts of Law Analysis
If there is no determinate lex monetae per i above, and the contract does not
specify any governing body of background law – any ‘law of the contract’ – per ii above,
then we apply the conflicts rules of jurisdiction in which the court entertaining the suit
sits to determine which law governs. Once that is determined, we proceed in
accordance with ii, just above. That is, if Greek law is found applicable, we’re back to 1
above, and otherwise we proceed to iv, below.

iv. Impracticability and Impossibility Doctrine
Finally, if Greek law turns out not to be applicable law, our Greek defendant will
likely argue excuse from performance on the contract in Euro as distinguished from
NeoD, per some variant of either the ‘impracticability’ doctrine, in the case of
Impediment Scenario A, or the ‘impossibility’ doctrine, in the case of Impediment
Scenario B.
As it happens, impracticability and impossibility doctrines look quite similar from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. I’ll focus on New York law, however, because so many
financial contracts name it as the governing law. In effect, then, we have two Scenario
Combinations to consider here – I.A.2 and I.B.2.
I’ll now run through the analysis in both, still staying with our present
hypothetical. The bottom line is that our Greek defendant would be unlikely to prevail
on an impracticability defense if faced with Impediment Scenario A, but might do better
with an impossibility defense were s/he faced with Impediment Scenario B.
Impracticability and Impossibility analyses, then, run as follows.
iv.1. Scenario I.A.2: Impracticability Doctrine
in Non-Greek Court Under Change Scenario I
(Greek exit of EMU) and Impediment Scenario
A (dramatic depreciation of Neo D relative to
Euro):

10

Contractual impracticability doctrine under New York Law follows Section 261 of
the Restatement Second, Contracts, and Section 2-615 of the Uniform Commercial
Code.
The first has it that, ‘[w]here, after a contract is made, a party’s performance is
made impracticable without his fault by the occurrence of an event the nonoccurrence of
which was a basic assumption on which the contract was made, his duty to render that
performance is discharged, unless the language or the circumstances indicate the
contrary.’8
The second is similar, though it refers by its terms to ‘sellers’ who are parties to
‘commercial’ contracts.9 Captioned ‘Excuse by Failure of Presupposed Conditions,’
Section 2-615 requires a breaching seller who would be excused from performing to
show (1) some contingency that (2) renders performance impracticable while (3) the
nonoccurrence of the contingency was ‘a basic assumption upon which the contract
was made.’10
Under both the Restatement and UCC provisions, the event or contingency in
question must have been unforeseen, not reasonably foreseeable, and beyond the
control of the breaching party.11 The breaching party also must not have ‘caused’ the
event or contingency.12 It must also be the case that nothing in the contract indicates
that the breaching party assumed the risk of such event or contingency.13 The event or
contingency must also ‘alter the essential nature of the agreement.’14

8

RESTATEMENT SECOND, CONTRACTS, Sec. 261. See also In re Dayton Seaside Associates No. 2,
L.P., 257 B.R. 123, 139 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 2000) (quoting same); In re Martin Paint Stores, 199 B.R. 258,
265, 29 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CCR) 647 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 1996), judgment aff’d, 207 B.R. 57 (S.D. N.Y. 1997)
(likewise).
9

Official Comment 9, however, notes that the ‘reason’ of the section could well apply to noncommercial contracts as well. See N.Y. U.C.C. Sec. 2-615 comment 9.
10

N.Y. U.C.C. Sec. 2-615.

11

See, e.g., in addition to the provisions themselves, Cliffstar Corp. v. Riverbend Products, Inc., 750
F. Supp. 81, 85, 13 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 3d 392 (W.D. N.Y. 1990).
12

13

Id. Also Allen v. City of Yonkers, 803 F. Supp. 679, 709-710 (S.D. N.Y. 1992).
See, e.g., Dayton Seaside, supra note 5 at 139.

14

See, e.g., Asphalt Intern., Inc. v. Enterprise Shipping Corp., S.A., 667 F.2d 261, 266, 33 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. 570 (2d Cir. 1981).
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Much of this language is of course a bit on the less-than-altogether-helpful side.
What sorts of impracticability-causing event or contingency would be ‘unforeseeable,’
would ‘alter the essential nature of the agreement,’ would be ‘basically’ assumed in the
contract not to occur, and not be a risk ‘assumed’ by the party seeking excuse are not
immediately obvious on the basis of these words and phrases alone. Hence much rides
upon how courts interpret and apply the operative terms in the specific factual contexts
of particular cases.
In that light, three observations seem most important for our purpose (which I
take, per our conversation, to be preservation of contractual continuity).
First, increased cost of performance, standing alone, does not ordinarily serve as
a basis for the impracticability excuse.15 Rather, the increased cost must stem from an
unforeseen, unforeseeable, risk-unassumed contingency that alters the ‘essential
nature’ of the performance.16 Where, as per our hypothetical, the ‘performance’ in
question is simply to pay Euros, the Change that sets our case in motion would not
seem to affect any ‘essential nature’ thereof. Perhaps an end to the Euro altogether,
per Regime Change Scenario II, considered below, would be otherwise. But even there
it seems doubtful, as we shall see.
Second, there have of course been multiple occasions in the past upon which
currencies have been changed – during the American Civil War, for example, as well as
in the aftermath of the First World War and the Russian Revolution, during the 1930s, in
the aftermath of the Second World War, and following the breakup of the former Soviet
Union and Soviet bloc.17
Unsurprisingly, each of these events occasioned litigation, sounding in contract,
predicated on breaches that defendants sought to excuse by reference to
impracticability.18 In virtually no such cases, including cases in which a new currency

15

See N.Y. U.C.C. Sec. 2-615 comment 4. Also Canusa Corp. v. A & R Lobosco, Inc., 986 F.
Supp. 723, 731 n.6, 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 73 (E.D. N.Y. 1997).
16

Id. Also Moyer v. City of Little Falls, 510 N.Y.S.2d 813 (Sup 1986); American Trading &
Production Corp. v. Shell Intern. Marine, Ltd., 343 F. Supp. 91, 95 (S.D. N.Y. 1971).
17

See generally Lenihan, at pp. xlv through lxxvii, for impressively exhaustive discussion of the
many cases referenced here.
18

Id.
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was considerably – if not indeed dramatically – less valuable than that which it replaced,
have American courts excused performance.19
Third, and perhaps most importantly of all, New York courts do not appear as of
yet to have applied the doctrine of impracticability outside the context of sale-of-goods
contracts governed by Article II of the UCC. In all other circumstances, notwithstanding
UCC Sec. 2-615 comment 9 cited supra, note 6, performances that are not impossible,
even if impracticable, must be performed, else damages be paid.20 This takes us to …

iv.2. Scenario I.B.2: Impossibility Doctrine in
Non-Greek Court Under Change Scenario I
(Greek exit of EMU) and Impediment Scenario
A (depreciation of Neo D relative to Euro):
Contractual impossibility doctrine under New York Law is a commonlaw doctrine,
by and large identical to impossibility doctrine under the laws of other US states as well
as those of other nations whose legal systems partake of the British commonlaw
tradition.
Impossibility excuses a party’s performance under a contract in only a very
narrowly circumscribed set of circumstances – circumstances that are but rarely found
by New York courts to obtain.21 An ‘act of God’ – or, next best thing, of government –

19

All such cases but one concerned the Confederate dollar, while the other case involved a longterm contract with price explicitly determined by reference to an index that turned out seriously to
underestimate inflation. See Aluminum Co. of America v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Suppl. 53, 70-78
(W.D. Pa. 1980).
It perhaps bears noting, however, that these were all cases in which lex monetae supported
plaintiffs as distinguished from the scenario here under consideration, in which lex monetae is unhelpful
owing to disagreement between Greece and the EU/EMU over the terms of Greece’s exit. The distinction
does not seem to me to make a difference, but perhaps it could be seized upon by a creative defendant’s
lawyer.
It also probably bears noting that some esteemed authorities of the past have argued that
collapse of a currency – as one could, I suppose, imagine happening to the NeoD – might under some
circumstances warrant a finding of impracticability even if courts thus far have declined so to find. See,
e.g., ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, 6 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS Sec. 1360 (1962); Evsey S. Rashba, Debts in
Collapsed Foreign Currencies, 54 YALE L. J. 1, 18-30 (1944). Lenihan for his part begs to differ with
Corbin and Rashba. My colleague Bob Hillman (a New York contract law authority), on the other hand,
seems somewhat more sympathetic to the Corbin line. I’ll soon consult with another colleague, Bob
Summers (of ‘White & Summers,’ on the UCC), to get his take as well.
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See GLEN BANKS, NEW YORK CONTRACT LAW Sec. 20:12 (2006) on this point.
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See, e.g., Lagarenne v. Ingber, 273 A.D.2d 735, 710 N.Y.S.2d 425 (3d Dep’t 2000).
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must intervene in such a way as to render performance either literally impossible –
typically through destruction of the subject matter of the contract – or literally illegal.22
As with impracticability, discussed above, so with impossibility, then, economic
hardship alone does not count.23 Not even bankruptcy does.24 ‘Impossibility’ really
means impossibility – or illegality.
It must also be the case, for impossibility to be found, that the contract has not
expressly allocated to either party the risk of that event which has putatively rendered
performance impossible.25 Relatedly, the event must not have been foreseeable to the
party invoking the doctrine.26 Nor can the impossibility in question be idiosyncratic to
the party invoking it – rather, it must be ‘objective,’ such that no other party, either,
would have been capable of rendering performance after the event in question
occurred.27
As noted a moment ago, performance can be counted impossible if rendered
illegal by law.28 But the law in question must of course have been promulgated after the
contract’s having been agreed,29 and generally must not have been foreseen by or
foreseeable to the party invoking impossibility on the new law’s basis.30 And again,
22

See, e.g., Bank of New York v. Tri Polyta Finance B.V., 2003 WL 1960587 (S.D. N.Y. 2003); In re
Regency Holdings (Cayman), Inc., 2001 WL 1033429 (S.D. N.Y. 2001).
23

See, e.g., Chase Manhattan Bank v. Traffic Stream (BVI) Infrastructure Ltd., 86 F.Sup. 2d 244,
259 (S.D. N.Y. 2000).
24

See. , e.g., Barclays Business Credit, Inc., v. Inter Urban Broadcasting of Cincinnati, Inc., 1991
WL 258751 (S.D. N.Y. 1991).
25

See, e.g., U.S. v. General Douglas MacArthur Senior Village, Inc., 508 F.2d 377, 381 (2d Cir.

1974).
26

See, e.g., Inter-Power of New York Inc. v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 208 A.D.2d 1073, 107475, 617 N.Y.S.2d 562, 564 (3d Dep’t 1994).
27

See, e.g., Beagle v. Parillo, 116 A.D.2d 856, 498 N.Y.S.2d 177 (3d Dep’t 1986); U.S. v.
Wegematic Corp., 360 F.2d 674, 675, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 372 (2d Cir. 1966).
28

See, e.g., Millgard Corp. v. E.E. Cruz/Nab/Fronier-Kemper, 2004 WL 1900359 (S.D. N.Y. 2004).
See also Restatement of Contracts, Sec. 457.
29

See, e.g., Scanlan v. Devon Systems, Inc., 2000 WL 218389 (S.D. N.Y. 2000).

30

See, e.g., Sagittarius Broadcasting Corp. v. Evergreen Media Corp., 226 A.D.2d 261, 641
st
N.Y.S.2d (1 Dep’t 1996) (unforeseen); Montgomery-Otsego-Schoharie Solid Waste Management
Authority v. County of Otsego, 249 A.D.2d 702, 671 N.Y.S.2d 545 (3d Dep’t 1998).
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mere hardship worked by the law does not suffice; the law must literally render illegal
the performance that would be excused.31 Nor will merely temporary illegality warrant a
finding of impossibility – the illegality in question must be of indefinite duration.32
Bringing these considerations to bear upon the circumstances laid out per
Impediment Scenario B, we can see that an impossibility defense by our Greek
defendant might be possible. Whether it would be would depend on the nature of the
capital controls imposed by the Greek government per that scenario.
Were Greece, for example, to prohibit purchase of foreign exchange – including
now Euro – by Greek nationals altogether, we would seem to have a textbook case of
‘act of God [government]’-wrought impossibility. All then would ride upon whether the
contract provided for this particular risk, or if not, then whether the risk was in any event
reasonably foreseeable by the party invoking impossibility – our Greek defendant.
Were the answer in both cases negative, then our German plaintiff would likely
have to challenge the Greek legislation itself, on some Constitutional or Treaty-based
theory of contract-impairment, rather than our Greek defendant. In essence, we would
be back to Venue Scenario 1, above.
If, on the other hand, Greece under the new regime employed some less
onerous form of capital controls, rendering the purchase of Euro by our defendant more
difficult and more expensive but not literally illegal or impossible, the story would be
different. Our Greek defendant would remain liable on the contract. Performance
would not be excused. Again, then, all now will ride on that proverbial ‘devil’ who
resides in the ‘details’ the Greek legislation that institutes what we’ve been calling ‘the
Change.’
And that closes discussion of the four possible scenario combinations – IA1, IA2,
IB1, IB2 – under Regime Change Scenario I, in which one or more nations leave the
EMU, with the EMU nevertheless continuing. Time now has come to consider a
dissolution of the EMU altogether. That is Regime Change Scenario II.
Analysis under Regime Change Scenario II, we shall see, is considerably simpler
than that under Regime Change Scenario I. First, how might contractual continuity
come to be implicated?

31

Chase-Manhattan, supra note 23.

32

Scanlan, supra note 29.

15

Here is what would seem the prototypical Hypothetical. I’ll again lay things out
by reference to a change, then a plaintiff and defendant whose contractual relation is
affected by the change. I’ll keep things as close to our first Hypothetical as possible in
order to facilitate focus on the one variation introduced here – that in the precise form of
the Regime Change that occurs.

B. Second Hypothetical
1. The Change
Let us assume first that the EMU simply dissolves, by mutual agreement of all
parties presently party to that Union. Assume that Greece replaces the Euro with, say,
a new national currency, the NeoDrachma (NeoD). It stipulates some NeoD/Euro
exchange rate and formally redenominates all pre-existing contracts bearing some
nexus to Greece – e.g. Greek sovereign bonds, loans to Greek nationals, etc. – in
NeoD. Call this ‘the Change.’ Something like this Change would seem to be requisite
to contractual continuity’s being so much as implicated under Regime Change Scenario
II.
Next, note that, in contrast to the story in Regime Change Scenario 1, in this
Scenario Greece probably needn’t adopt any particular policy with respect to the postChange NeoD/Euro exchange rate, for the Euro will simply cease to exist. The one
possible exception would be the circumstance in which the terms of the EMU’s
dissolution were such as to ‘phase out’ the Euro over some period, analogously to the
way in which the Euro was ‘phased in’ in the first instance.
Were that to occur, analysis here during the phase-out would be more or less
identical to that under Regime Change Scenario I, above. I shall therefore incorporate
that analysis by reference here for any phase-out period. Then, once we’re past any
phase-out period, we have the following.
Greece will presumably adopt some policy concerning the NeoD’s relation to
other currencies in the world, even if not, under this Scenario, to the now non-existent
Euro. There are of course several possibilities.
First, Greece might undertake to peg the NeoD to some other currency – say, oh,
I don’t know, a NeuDeutscheMark – to keep it credible. This seems unlikely unless
Greece intends that the peg be adjustable, more on which prospect below. For
adopting a nonadjustable peg would deny Greece sufficient monetary policy autonomy
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as to permit repeated periodic de- and/or revaluations, which would presumably be
among those considerations prompting the Change here in the first place.
A second prospect seems nearly as unlikely. That would be Greece’s aiming to
permit a free float of its currency on the ForEx markets. This seems unlikely in light of
the new NeoD’s likely vulnerability, at least early on, to speculative attack on the ForEx
markets.
More likely, then, Greece will aim to operate with either third, an adjustable peg,
or fourth, a ‘managed float’ on the ForEx markets. Either policy will presumably be
conducted by its central bank – the Bank of Greece, or ‘BG’ (which is still not to be
confused with Australian singing group of I970s).
Now, if Greece maintains a nonadjustable peg – again, unlikely – it will surely
have to employ capital controls as well. Some form of capital control or regulation,
albeit variably strict depending on events in the global capital and ForEx markets, also
will presumably be necessary in connection with an adjustable peg or a managed float.
Which of these strategies is selected, and how successfully it is implemented if it
be something other than free float, will bear upon subsequent litigation in manners to be
noted below.

2. The Plaintiff and Defendant
Next, per our hypothetical, we’ll assume that a, oh, I don’t know … German
national is owed a contractual debt by the Greek Treasury or a Greek national. The
contract denominates the debt in Euro, and the German national understands that this
is no longer possible. Our plaintiff might nevertheless come to be aggrieved, in a
manner that implicates law, under various conceivable circumstances.
If one of the following occurs, the Greek Treasury or our Greek national might well
encounter difficulty in performing on the contract in a manner satisfactory to the German
plaintiff even if they wish to do so, with the legal significance that the difficulty carries
riding upon which actually occurs.

a. Impediment Scenario A (Colorable Lex Monetae or
Impracticability Defense)
We assume Greece has allowed the NeoD to float, either freely or in managed
fashion, or it maintains an adjustable peg which has indeed now been adjusted.
Assume either way that the consequence is that NeoD now is worth much less relative
17

to Euro than it was at the time of the Change. In other words, its value is now much
vitiated by effective inflation of the NeoD itself.
Our German plaintiff, however, insists on payment at the original NeoD/Euro
exchange rate at the time of the Change, with the current ‘shadow Euro’ value
determined by, say, reference to a weighted average of the values of all other erstwhile
Euro-currencies. This will invite invocation of the lex monetae doctrine, as well,
perhaps, of the ‘commercial impracticability’ excuse of contractual performance by our
Greek defendant should the German plaintiff demand payment at the original exchange
rate in non-Greek court.

b. Impediment Scenario B (Colorable Impossibility Defense)
We shall assume that Greece maintains a strict or adjustable peg, or manages a
float, and to facilitate pursuit of that policy also imposes capital controls. The controls
are such, in turn, as to prevent ready payment of foreign nationals with NeoD. If such
payment is simply rendered more difficult than it otherwise would have been, but is not
rendered illegal or otherwise literally impossible, then again we are looking at
prospective lex monetae or ‘impracticability’ excuse of performance, as in Case A.
If, on the other hand, capital controls are such as actually to render payment with
NeoD illegal or impossible, then this will invite invocation of ‘impossibility’ excuse of
contractual performance should German national demand payment in NeoD, per
legislatively redenominated terms of the contract, in non-Greek court. Finally, our
German plaintiff sues our Greek defendant on the contract, seeking payment in NeoD at
the original exchange rate. There are then two more sub-scenarios to consider.

c. Venue Scenario 1 (Action Brought in Greek Court)
Assume that the contract action is brought in Greek (domestic) court. In this
case the redenomination is again going to be recognized, inasmuch as Greek courts
apply Greek law. The only question will be whether the defendant may depart from the
originally legislated exchange rate, which in turn will depend on what the legislation
itself has to say here. If the legislation stipulates that the original exchange rate
remains applicable (which seems unlikely if Greek government aims to maintain
adjustability of currency relative to others), and defendant encounters difficulty paying in
consequence, then analysis will proceed along lines sketched in 2, below.
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If, on the other hand, legislation provides for payment in NeoD, period, with no
reference to any particular relative value thereof, then defendant will prevail under lex
monetae. Presumably, however, plaintiff will now aim to appeal to some higher court
within Greek, EU or global legal systems, perhaps challenging the legislation itself on
constitutional or cognate treaty grounds insofar as it impairs preexisting contractual
obligations. It would seem, however, that plaintiff will not likely prevail in such case, in
view of the weight all nations appear to place upon lex monetae.
d. Venue Scenario 2 (Action brought in Non-Greek Court)
Now assume that the contract action is brought in non-Greek (foreign), e.g., New
York court: Now the court will embark upon a multi-step analysis. First it will determine
the lex monetae – the law of the sovereign that issues the currency named in the
contract. For that law, again under the ‘state theory’ of money that all nations (including
the US) appear to uphold, determines what counts as tender in discharge of an
obligation denominated in the currency issued by that sovereign. And this is so
notwithstanding any depreciation on the part of some newly issued currency relative to
what ever currency it replaces, and notwithstanding any other body of law named in the
contract (i.e., any ‘law of the contract,’ per v, below).
The only question, then, would be how inflation, per our Hypothetical, would
affect defendant’s obligation, and this in turn would ride, as in 1 just above, on what the
Greek legislation itself had to say about the matter. If the Greek legislation said nothing
about retention of an initial exchange rate for redenomination purposes, plaintiff would
again be out of luck, as envisaged in 1, just above. Only recourse then would be
constitutional-like challenge to the legislation itself.
On the other hand, if the Greek legislation did provide for revaluation of
redenominated sums in a manner that continued to reflect the initial exchange rate
stipulated in the legislation, then defendant would wish to appeal to impracticability or
impossibility doctrine as discussed above. That would raise the question of which
jurisdiction’s such doctrine was applicable. Hence we would turn to …

i. Law of the Contract
First we determine the so-called ‘law of the contract,’ if such there be. That is, if
the contract states which law shall govern its own interpretation and application, we
proceed to analyze the impracticability or impossibility question under that law. (Many
financial contracts of course stipulate that the law of the State of New York shall
govern.)
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If the law in question is that of Greece, then we are again back to Venue
Scenario 1, above. If the law is not that of Greece, then we proceed to vii, below, to
apply the apposite jurisdiction’s impracticability or impossibility doctrines, depending on
whether we’re faced with Impediment Scenario A or B. Finally, if the contract does not
name any particular body of law as governing – that is, if there is no ‘law of the contract’
– then we fall back to …

ii. Conflicts of Law Analysis
If there is no governing body of background law per v above, then apply the
conflicts rules of jurisdiction in which the court entertaining the suit sits to determine
which law governs. Once that is determined, proceed in accordance with v, just above.
That is, if Greek law is found applicable, we’re back to 1 above, and otherwise we
proceed to vii, below.

iii. Impracticability or Impossibility Defenses
Finally, if Greek law turns out not to be applicable law apart from defining the
currency, and that law in turn, per its redenomination provision, appears to suggest that
redenomination occurs strictly in keeping with the first-stated exchange rate between
the new NeoD and the old Euro, and the NeoD in the meanwhile has significantly
dropped in value, our Greek defendant might argue excuse from performance per some
variant of either the ‘impracticability’ doctrine, in the case of Impediment Scenario A, or
the ‘impossibility’ doctrine, in the case of Impediment Scenario B. Analysis will then
proceed as laid out above in connection with each doctrine.

V. A SPECIAL CASE? THE NEW YORK GENERAL OBLIGATIONS LAW
Ah, but wait. What about the 1997 Amendments to the New York General
Obligations Law? As the reader likely knows, New York amended its general
obligations law in 1997 to ensure continuity of contract after the Euro, pursuant to the
EMU’s coming into being, replaced the ECU.33 That was an important measure to take,
because many contracts – particularly derivative and other financial contracts – are

33

See S.B. 5049, 220th Leg., 1997-1998 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1997) (to be codified at N.Y. GEN.
OBLIG. LAW Sections 5-1601-1604).
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either are entered into in the state of New York, name New York law as the law of the
contract, or both.
In essence, the 1997 Amendments provide that if a subject or medium of
payment of a contract, security or financial instrument is the pre-Euro European
Currency Unit (ECU), the Euro will count as a commercially reasonable substitute and
substantial equivalent. The Euro accordingly may be used to determine the value of the
ECU at the time of payment, or maybe tendered, at an exchange rate specified in or
calculable in accordance with regulations adopted by the Council of the European
Union.
None of this would seem to change the analysis provided above. There are two
reasons. The first, narrower reason is that the amendment to the General Obligations
law refers by terms to contracts denominated in ECU, providing in essence that the
Euro now is, for all commercially practical intents and purposes, the ECU. It says
nothing about, nor does it appear in any way to contemplate, any prospective retreat
from the Euro (or ECU) to distinct national currencies.
The second, broader reason is that the amendment to the General Obligations
law appears to have been meant simply to codify and make plain in one place
something that already would have been legally true – namely, that per the lex monetae
of the EMU, which New York and all other jurisdictions already would have accepted per
the ‘state theory of money’ that predominates across the world, the ECU has now been
officially replaced by the Euro. The amendment accordingly added nothing of
substance, but merely declared in an up-front, statutory fashion what was already true
as a matter of commonlaw.

VI. CONCLUSION: KEEPING IT UNREAL
I hope I have managed to render more tractable that complex, multilayered
problem that could be occasioned by what has become, alas, more than a mere
abstract possibility.34 While I do not believe fundamental EMU regime change to be
likely – desirable as I believe at least one temporary change to that regime would be – I
do think it helpful to think-through in advance what legal consequences would be apt to
follow were such change to occur.

34

The reader is hereby reminded that the Appendix immediately following reduces all of the
analysis to conveniently tractable, ‘flowchart’ form.
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Contingency planning of this sort not only assures more orderly, less panicked
responses in the event that the contemplated eventuality does occur; it also, in
forestalling panic, actually lessens the likelihood of the eventuality itself. For as we
know well from hundreds of years of financial history, financial and money markets are
one realm in which prophecies, dire or exuberant, are apt to prove self-fulfilling.

Appendix: Flow Chart Summary (Read Top to Bottom, then Left to Right)

Regime Change I: Exit by One or More EMU Members – Country G

Hypothetical: Contract in Euros, Non-G Party Prefers Payment in Euros

Impediment A: New G currency depreciates
Euro Purchase
G-Defendant prefers pay in new G-currency
Venue 1: Suit in G Ct.
2: Suit in NY Ct.

Impediment B: Cap Controls Prevent
G-Defendant unable to pay in Euro

Venue 2: Suit in NY Ct.

Defendant prevails35 Seek Lex Monetae (LM)
Lex Monetae

Venue 1: Suit in G Ct.

Defendant prevails

Venue

Seek

If G/EMU split amicably,

If G/EMU split

LM is G. And…

LM is G. And

amicably,
…
If G, Def. prevails

If G, Def. prevails

If not split amicably,
There’s no Lex Monetae

If not split amicably,
No Lex

If no Lex Monetae

If no Lex Monetae

Monetae

35

Note that at any point herein at which G prevails, plaintiff may nonetheless challenge new G
legislation itself on constitutional or treaty-based grounds for impairment of contract. That might be
difficult in view of lex monetae, but ...
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Seek Law of Contract

Seek Law of

Contract
If G, Def. prevails
If not G, go to bottom line

If G, Def. prevails
If not G, to bottom

If no Law of Contract
Conflicts Analysis
If G, Def. prevails

If no Law of Contract
Conflicts Analysis
If G, Def. prevails

line

Bottom
wins
Line:
Claim

If not G, Def. loses

If not G, Def.

Impracticability Claim

Impossibility

Regime Change II: Dissolution of EMU

Hypothetical: Contract in Euros, Non-G Party Prefers Payment in G Currency at Initial
Exchange Rate

Impediment A: New G currency depreciates
Payout
G-Defendant prefers pay at current rate

Venue 1: Suit in G Ct.
2: Suit in NY Ct.

Impediment B: Cap Controls Prevent
G-Defendant unable to pay at all

Venue 2: Suit in NY Ct.

If G Legis Does not Seek Lex Monetae
Monetae
G’tee Exchange Rate
Defendant prevails36 Lex Monetae is G.

Venue 1: Suit in G Ct.

Defendant prevails

Venue

Seek Lex

Lex Monetae is G.

36

Note again that at any point herein at which G prevails, plaintiff may nonetheless challenge new
G legislation itself on constitutional or treaty-based grounds for impairment of contract. That might be
difficult in view of lex monetae, but ...
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If G Legis G’tees
Defendant prevails
Exchange Rate
Employ
Impracticability
Analysis per
above

Hence Venue 1 analysis
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